(ZENIT News / London, 10.25.2026).- Europe’s churches may be losing regular worshippers, but religion continues to influence the continent in ways that are less visible and potentially more consequential than Sunday attendance. From educational choices and family size to migration policy and economic behaviour, religious traditions remain embedded in the social norms that shape public life, according to a review of economic research published by the Rockwool Foundation Berlin.
The study, “Religion and Economic Growth: What We Know and Why It Matters”, brings together evidence from different periods and regions to examine how faith influences prosperity. Its authors include Sascha Becker, an economics professor at the University of Warwick, Jared Rubin of Chapman University and Ludger Woessmann of the University of Munich. Their central argument challenges the assumption that religion has become economically irrelevant in increasingly secular societies.
“Anyone who considers religion a marginal factor overlooks a fundamental part of the structure of our societies,” Becker told Religion News Service, arguing that faith continues to shape the social norms and institutions through which policies are developed.
Education offers one of the clearest examples. Religious institutions played a major historical role in spreading literacy, particularly through the need to read biblical texts. Their influence has not disappeared. Across Europe, religious schools and long-established educational traditions continue to affect parental choices and the formation of human capital.
In England, approximately one-third of state-funded schools have a religious character. Most are associated with the Church of England (anglican), while a substantial number belong to the Catholic Church and smaller groups are connected to Jewish and Muslim communities.
Becker cautions against assuming that religious schools automatically deliver better educational outcomes, since family selection and peer-group effects complicate comparisons. Nevertheless, their appeal extends beyond committed believers. Some secular parents choose them because they associate them with discipline, a clear moral framework and high expectations.
For policymakers, the challenge is therefore not whether to endorse religious doctrine, but how to understand its relationship with secular education. Measures intended to improve literacy, scientific skills, social integration or women’s participation in the labour market may encounter resistance if religious communities perceive them as threats to their identity. The distinction between education that complements religious formation and education that displaces it can have practical consequences.
Religion also remains relevant to debates over migration and social cohesion, although its influence is neither uniform nor invariably positive. In Britain, movements invoking Christianity as part of national identity have emerged amid opposition to immigration. Yet many Christian leaders have been reluctant to endorse such campaigns, particularly when their political message conflicts with the Gospel’s call to welcome the stranger.
Religious organisations frequently play a different role on the ground. Catholic charities and groups such as the Jesuit Refugee Service help migrants learn languages, navigate public services and establish themselves in unfamiliar communities.
Understanding these networks, Becker argues, can help governments avoid both unrealistic assumptions about multiculturalism and policies that demand simple assimilation. Religious identity can influence integration, but it does not dictate a single political response.
Spain illustrates the importance of looking beyond theology alone. Becker attributes the country’s comparatively welcoming approach to migrants partly to labour shortages, while recognising the contribution of Catholic institutions and charities to their reception and support. Economic needs, public attitudes and religious commitments can reinforce one another, but they should not be confused.
That debate has acquired renewed significance following Pope Leo XIV’s recent visit to Spain and the Canary Islands, where he met migrants and organisations involved in rescuing and assisting people arriving by sea from Africa. The Pope challenged political leaders to recognise the human reality behind migration, asking whether Christians had recognised Christ in those who arrive exhausted by hunger, fear and violence. He also urged governments to share responsibility for migrants, protect them from criminal trafficking networks and help address the conditions driving people to leave their homelands.
The broader lesson is that religious principles can shape public action even when governments make decisions for practical rather than explicitly theological reasons. The reverse is also true: religion can contribute to serious social harm when interpreted in ways that deny fundamental rights. The researchers cite Afghanistan, where Taliban restrictions on women’s participation in the workforce have helped constrain economic activity. Religious influence, in other words, cannot be assessed simply by measuring its presence; the content and consequences of its teachings matter.
Faith communities are also increasingly engaging with environmental questions, encouraging simpler lifestyles, more sustainable development and limits on consumption. Becker suggests that such commitments could have substantial economic implications, raising questions about whether prosperity must depend on ever-increasing consumption or whether religious traditions might help encourage a different, greener model of growth.
He is less convinced, however, that churches exert a decisive ethical influence over political and economic elites today. The United States, where church attendance remains comparatively high, is also strongly capitalist, illustrating the tension between religious moral teaching and economic practice. The Catholic Church has long criticised aspects of economic systems that subordinate human dignity to profit, but the existence of such teaching does not guarantee that it will govern the behaviour of those in power.
Europe itself offers an example of how religious ideas can survive after their theological origins have faded from public view. Catholic social teaching helped shape concepts such as solidarity and subsidiarity, which influenced the intellectual foundations of European integration. Subsidiarity, in particular, holds that higher authorities should support families, local communities and smaller institutions rather than unnecessarily replacing their responsibilities. Within the European Union, it now operates as a secular legal principle guiding decisions about which level of government should act.
The transformation is significant: a concept rooted in a religious understanding of society has acquired a broader meaning within a pluralistic political order. Its religious ancestry remains part of Europe’s intellectual history, even where its contemporary application no longer depends on religious belief.
The Rockwool Foundation’s review does not suggest that religion invariably produces prosperity, better schools or more cohesive societies. Rather, it challenges policymakers to recognise that religious convictions continue to influence choices about education, work, family life, migration and consumption. Secularisation may weaken formal religious participation without erasing the values and institutions formed over centuries.
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